27 October 2026

Arda Öztaşkın · Smart Sustainability

Climate Finance: Clear Benefits, Complicated Accounts

Climate finance is not a single pool. Mitigation, transition, adaptation, and loss and damage each require different institutions, risk assessments and financing models.

Large numbers are circulating. Every enormous sum announced is greeted as though it might finally resolve the problems that have kept things locked in place. The European Investment Bank's €30 billion climate adaptation plan, announced last week, could initially be read in this way. The amount, set for 2026–2030, is roughly twice that of the previous five-year period. It describes a broad field of investment, from energy networks and water systems to agriculture and public buildings.

Good news. But to understand what this figure means, one point needs to be clarified first. Climate finance is not a single investment category. Four different kinds of money circulate under the same heading, and the calculations behind each are different.

One heading, four different calculations

Climate finance encompasses funding from public and private sources that supports emissions reductions and adaptation to the effects of climate change. Yet not every resource discussed on the climate agenda has the same revenue model, risk structure or measure of success.

These differences can be understood through four areas. They are not disconnected from one another; transition finance and mitigation, in particular, overlap considerably.

Mitigation finance aims to lower emissions. Solar and wind farms, energy efficiency, clean transport, low-carbon production… A significant proportion of these investments generates revenue through electricity sales or energy savings. Investors can anticipate the cost, return and repayment period. This is therefore the easiest area to finance.

Transition finance supports the transformation of high-emitting sectors. Investments that enable steel or cement production with lower emissions fall into this category. Here, it is necessary to examine not just the asset being financed, but the company as a whole. Are there interim targets? Is capital expenditure aligned with them? Does the board take responsibility? Does the investment genuinely lower emissions intensity, or extend the life of a high-carbon facility? If these questions remain unanswered, transition finance funds not the transition, but its shadow.

Adaptation finance builds resilience to the effects of the climate crisis. Flood protection, drought-resistant agriculture, infrastructure that reduces water losses, early warning systems, cities suited to extreme heat… Here, the economic benefit often comes from losses avoided in the future.

Loss and damage finance aims to remedy losses caused by the climate crisis. Repairing destroyed infrastructure, supporting people who have lost their livelihoods, and meeting the needs of displaced communities fall within this area. It is the form of finance least suited to the conventional logic of investment returns, and the one in which debates over justice and access are most pronounced.

These areas naturally intersect. But their financing needs are not interchangeable. Describing them all through one large aggregate figure conceals how far each need is being met.

The multiplier of adaptation finance

The European Investment Bank emphasises that every euro spent on mitigation and adaptation can save up to ten euros in loss and damage. This is a powerful argument for adaptation's economic value. It should not, however, be read as a guaranteed rate of return applicable to every project.

Consider an investment in flood protection. Families whose homes are not flooded, shopkeepers who do not have to close, businesses whose production is not disrupted, insurers paying less compensation, and public institutions spending less on emergency relief all benefit. The benefit is real. But it is spread across different people, institutions and years. This is where the problem begins. The institution making the investment bears the cost today, while much of the saving appears on someone else's accounts, and in the future.

The economist Paul Samuelson explained this through the example of a lighthouse. Imagine a lighthouse. Everyone benefits, but nobody wants to pay. Either the state builds it or nobody does. Dykes built to prevent flooding are like lighthouses. Their benefits are indivisible, no one can be excluded, and they therefore cannot be sold.

A project that society needs may not always create sufficient motivation for a lender. Yet in England, lighthouses were built by private investors for centuries and financed through port fees. What appeared to be an unsellable benefit could be paid for through the right institutional arrangements.

This is adaptation finance's central difficulty. High public benefits strengthen the case for investment, but do not resolve its financing on their own. That requires an institutional link between benefit and investment. The Netherlands is a good example. For centuries, the country has financed flood protection through “water boards”. Property owners in the protected area pay a levy for the maintenance of the dyke that protects their land.

Different risk maps for investors

This distinction within climate finance is also decisive for investors and the financial sector. Each type of finance requires a different capacity for assessment and pricing.

In mitigation investments, technology costs, energy prices, carbon value and demand come to the fore. In transition finance, the company's strategy, capital plan and carbon risk are decisive. In adaptation, alongside physical risk data, the project owner's ability to pay, who benefits from the avoided loss, and who retains the maintenance obligation become important.

For banks, the issue is not launching a new green lending product. What matters is reflecting physical climate risk in collateral values, maturities and cash flows. Nor is it enough for asset managers simply to select “green assets”; they must monitor which climate hazards portfolio companies are exposed to, what resilience investments they need, and whether this expenditure has been incorporated into their investment plans.

Technology-supported climate data can, of course, inform these decisions. But a risk map does not turn into an investment decision by itself. Data shows where a project belongs; it does not establish ownership, a revenue model, the sharing of benefits or responsibility for maintenance. These are institutional decisions.

A new question for finance at COP31

This matters for COP31's claim to be about “implementation”. Belém left two legacies: a shared set of indicators for the Global Goal on Adaptation, and a call to triple adaptation finance by 2035.

Everyone says threefold, but nobody says three times what. Adaptation finance provided by developed countries to developing countries in 2023 was $26 billion; the UN's estimate of annual needs is $310 billion. The question “How much?” has therefore not yet been fully answered. The question “Through which instrument, which institution and which measure of success?” has not even been asked.

This could be one of COP31's concrete contributions: a shared framework for countries' project pipelines, not just lists of financing needs. For every project, the type of risk, project owner, beneficiaries, financing instrument, maintenance budget and distribution of benefits should be clearly identified. Alongside “How much money?”, this would add the question: “Which risk, on which institution's balance sheet, will be reduced through which investment?”

Such a framework is particularly necessary for developing countries. Countries with limited project preparation capacity may remain unable to access resources even as funds grow. Money flows to large institutions with ready-made project files. Vulnerable regions are left out once again. Project development support must therefore be an integral part of the financing architecture.

For a host country that has experienced earthquakes, floods and droughts, and has operated compulsory earthquake insurance for twenty-five years, the strongest contribution to the table is not merely a figure, but a framework showing how risk can be recorded on a balance sheet.

Thirty billion euros is good news. Better news will be seeing that money turn into investments that reduce risk, are maintained, and have someone clearly responsible for them.

Sources and related research