2 November 2026

Arda Öztaşkın · Smart Sustainability

COP31 and Climate Geopolitics

Ahead of COP31, the industrial and energy strategies of the US, China and EU are reshaping competition. Where does Türkiye stand in this new order?

Climate policies, energy investments, artificial intelligence, critical minerals and trade measures are all parts of this question. When we treat them as separate topics, we see the developments but miss the big picture.

My reading is this: the United States is trying to turn technological superiority into manufacturing strength, China is trying to turn manufacturing superiority into technological independence, and Europe is trying to turn the size of its market back into industrial strength.

COP31 will convene at the intersection of these three different transformation projects. To read between Antalya's lines, we first need to understand how this new competitiveness is being built.

The unit of competition is changing

We are used to assessing a factory's competitiveness through wages, exchange rates, energy prices and productivity. These remain important. But conditions that a factory cannot resolve on its own are becoming increasingly decisive.

When will it be able to connect to the grid? Which technology will it be able to access? On what terms and maturities will financing be available? In which market will its product receive support? Will its critical input be treated as a commercial product, or as a strategic good subject to an export permit?

Two companies using the same machine can encounter different economic realities in different countries.

New competitiveness therefore does not consist solely of reducing a business's costs. It rests on states' capacity to shape energy, finance, technology and demand conditions together.

Companies compete, but the conditions under which they compete are increasingly constructed politically.

America's concern is not just more oil

Reading the Trump administration's energy approach as a return to fossil fuels leaves out the technological dimension of the strategy.

America's AI Action Plan addresses data centres, semiconductor manufacturing, energy infrastructure, the grid and technology exports within the same framework. It draws a direct connection between faster permitting processes and technological superiority.

The strategic logic is this: possessing the world's leading technology companies is not enough. It is also necessary to build the physical capacity that can sustain their growth.

Advanced technology is once again tied to power plants, cables, transformers, land and permitting schedules. The policy of expanding energy supply should therefore also be read as an attempt to keep computing capacity and future productivity gains within the country.

The success of this approach is not guaranteed. A mismatch between electricity demand and infrastructure investment can create costs. But the goal is clear: to expand the economic returns of technology leadership without running into the physical limits of production.

Washington's withdrawal from the climate table does not mean withdrawal from the economy of the future. Its priorities are shifting towards determining the energy conditions of technological growth according to its own preferences.

China's concern is not just more exports

Describing China as a supplier of cheap equipment is similarly incomplete.

Beijing's strategic challenge is to preserve its manufacturing scale while reducing technological dependencies that can be constrained from abroad. The 2026–2030 plan addresses semiconductors, industrial software, advanced materials, artificial intelligence and new energy technologies together. The artificial intelligence and manufacturing plan announced in January 2026 likewise aims to embed technology in production processes.

This has important implications for competition. Artificial intelligence is not merely a new service to sell, but a production tool that can deepen existing industrial superiority.

When energy equipment, batteries, motors, robots and industrial software develop together in an economy, the advantage does not arise from the price of a single product. Suppliers learn from one another, new products enter production more quickly, and technology can be applied across a broader manufacturing base.

Competing with China is therefore harder than making the same panel or battery. The competitor is not a single factory, but a set of mutually reinforcing manufacturing capabilities.

The importance of critical minerals must also be understood within this whole. Control over a resource gains power when combined with the industry that processes it and turns it into a finished product. The quantity underground does not produce the same result on its own.

Europe's turn: from setting rules to creating demand

Europe faces a different problem. Being a large market does not guarantee remaining a major producer of new technologies.

A product may be consumed in Europe while its technology, manufacturing and profits accumulate elsewhere. Nor does the application of European standards worldwide automatically bring industrial investment to Europe.

I read the Clean Industrial Deal as a response to this problem. The Commission combines energy costs, finance, demand for clean products and manufacturing capacity in a single programme. The Industrial Accelerator Act proposal it presented in March 2026 likewise emphasises both low-carbon criteria and European production in public procurement and support for strategic sectors.

There is an important change of direction here. Europe does not simply want to determine which products may enter its market; it is also trying to create the demand that will allow its own producers to invest. This is why the link between carbon standards and public procurement matters. Defining a low-carbon product is one thing; providing its producer with a predictable customer is another.

The latter can make high upfront costs easier to finance. Regulation thus changes from a compliance requirement into an instrument for building industrial capacity. But this is also where Europe's risk lies. If policies protecting production cannot generate efficiency and scale, they may create a permanent need for support rather than close the competitiveness gap.

What the three strategies have in common

Washington, Beijing and Brussels are not applying the same model. Yet all three show a tendency not to leave the conditions of future production entirely to the market.

Energy sources, access to technology, investment finance and customer demand cease to be separate files. They become connected.

This is COP31's economic significance. An electrification target is also a question of production locations; a critical minerals agreement, of access to technology; a carbon standard, of markets; and climate finance, of the cost of investment.

This does not diminish the importance of climate targets. It explains why achieving them can no longer be considered separately from competitive strategies.

But there is a decisive distinction. A country's industrial gains and the world's emissions gains are not the same measure. A policy may move production from one country to another without reducing global emissions to the same extent. We therefore need to track where investment takes place separately from which production it replaces.

Türkiye's position

This picture changes the question for Türkiye.

Lower wages, a favourable exchange rate, geographical proximity and flexible production retain their value. But if competing countries offer clean electricity, long-term finance, technology development and guaranteed demand together, these advantages may not be sufficient on their own.

A company in Türkiye will not be competing only with a foreign company. It will also be competing with the economic conditions built behind that company.

It is therefore insufficient to assess incentives as instruments for attracting individual investments. We need to choose which investments will reinforce one another.

Does battery investment develop materials, recycling and engineering capabilities? Does electrification open a market for equipment manufacturers? Does public procurement provide the first customer for domestic technology? Does energy investment make industrial costs predictable?

Strategic gains arise from these connections. This is also where Türkiye's proposition at COP31 can become stronger: turning the climate target from disconnected project announcements into a programme for productivity and industrial capacity.

That is why I will not read Antalya solely through the promises made there. I will look at which targets have electricity infrastructure, access to technology, finance and real customers behind them. In the new competitive order, it is not enough simply to show an investor a location. We need to build the economic system in which production will operate.

Will we build the conditions to host the production of the future, or try to hold our place by adapting to conditions built by others?

Sources and related research