21 October 2026

Arda Öztaşkın · Smart Sustainability

COP31, the Electricity Economy and the Grid Bottleneck

The energy transition’s bottleneck is shifting to grids, connection queues and financing. A Grid Implementation Scorecard could make COP31’s electricity targets tangible.

As COP31's host, Türkiye is heading to Antalya with a number: 35. The goal is to raise electricity's share of global final energy consumption from around 20 percent today to 35 percent by 2035. In shorthand, “35×35”.

The target looks in the right direction. Emissions will not fall unless cars, domestic boilers and industrial furnaces switch to electricity. Four-fifths of the world's final energy still comes directly from fossil fuels. But what a target measures may not be the same thing that blocks the transition.

While the 35×35 target focuses on electricity use, the transition's bottleneck is increasingly shifting towards the grid and the cost of financing it.

The bottleneck has moved

Ten years ago, the central question was whether clean electricity was expensive. As panels and turbines became cheaper, the question changed: “Can this electricity be transported, used when needed, and delivered to consumers at a reasonable cost?”

The electricity economy describes this whole: the capacity to generate, transmit and store clean electricity and turn it into economic value; the institutions that finance that capacity and the arrangements that distribute its costs.

Three interdependent transitions operate within this economy. The first is electrification: how many activities are powered by electricity. The second is electricity decarbonisation: what that electricity is generated from. The third is infrastructure and finance: whether the grid can be built on time and the service provided at a reasonable price.

Progress in one does not substitute for the others. In a coal-based grid, the climate benefits of electric vehicles remain limited. A solar plant that cannot connect to the grid cannot replace fossil fuels either. The issue is therefore not merely installing more panels, but turning the electricity generated into a usable service and building the infrastructure needed to do so.

The example of England

In England, Microsoft recently cancelled a lease agreement for a planned data centre in Loughton. The project had a customer, technology and capital. What it lacked was a grid connection that would deliver electricity on time.

The 50-megawatt project fell off the schedule because of connection delays. Nor is this simply an isolated setback. Eighty-five percent of data centre company Nscale's $103 billion portfolio of future contracts rests on agreements linked to Microsoft and Anthropic. A delay at a substation therefore turns not only into a technical problem, but into a financing risk for billions of dollars in expected revenue.

This example does not directly concern a renewable energy project. That is precisely why it matters. It shows that the grid is no longer technical infrastructure in the background of the energy sector; it has become the boundary of the entire new economy, from artificial intelligence to industry, and from electric transport to heating.

The energy transition's problem today is less about generating electricity than about building its route in time.

Two different timescales

Solar and wind farms can be built relatively quickly. Once financing, equipment and land are available, a solar project can come online within a few years. Data centres proceed at a similar investment rhythm. The grid, however, lives on a completely different timescale.

We can describe this difference as an “infrastructural time gap”. On one side is the time of capital, technology and political targets. On the other is the time of land acquisition, environmental assessment, local acceptance, equipment procurement and physical construction. While the first accelerates, the second cannot accelerate to the same extent.

The energy transition and the system that must carry it run on different clocks. Grid inadequacy is therefore not merely an infrastructure gap. It is the physical form of the distance between targets and implementation.

Installed capacity is not usable energy

The success of the energy transition is often measured by how many gigawatts of renewable capacity have been installed. Yet “installed capacity” is not as revealing an indicator as it may seem.

A power plant may have been built but still be awaiting a connection. It may be connected to the grid but have to curtail output because of congestion on the lines. It may generate electricity, yet the energy's economic value may remain very low because storage, demand flexibility or regional transmission capacity is unavailable. Installed capacity is therefore not the same as energy that can be generated; nor is energy that can be generated the same as energy that can be used.

As of mid-2026, at least 16 countries in the European Union have grid connection queues. According to data cited by the European Commission, roughly 120 gigawatts of mature renewable energy projects, including 1.5 million household installations, are at risk of not obtaining a connection in time by 2030.

The problem is not only a shortage of lines. Existing capacity is not displayed transparently, projects that have not reached genuine investment maturity fill the queues, and applications are still largely managed according to a “first come, first connected” logic.

One thing is clear. Installing a panel is an investment decision. Getting its electricity into the system is a matter of institutional capacity.

Not cables, but the politics of allocation

We think of the grid as a technical system made up of cables, poles and transformers. Yet when capacity becomes scarce, a grid connection becomes a political and economic allocation decision.

Who will receive new capacity? A data centre? An electric vehicle factory? A green hydrogen facility? A new solar plant? Household electrification? Or the expansion of existing energy-intensive industry?

When there is not enough capacity to meet all these needs at once, the regulator is effectively deciding which direction the economy will grow in, even if it does not say so explicitly. An electricity connection ceases to be a permit and becomes a choice among the economic activities of the future.

At this point, the grid is the energy transition's invisible political economy.

Who receives connection capacity, according to which criteria and at what price, determines not only energy security but also industrial policy, regional development and the geography of the digital economy. A company that obtains a connection quickly can invest. A company left in the queue faces capital costs, delays and eventually cancellation.

Türkiye aims to increase installed solar and wind capacity to 120 gigawatts in 2035. In other words, the goal is to triple today's capacity over the next ten years. Electricity demand is also expected to grow strongly over the same period.

This target does not simply mean building more power plants. It requires new transmission lines between regions where generation is concentrated and centres of consumption, modernisation of distribution networks, digital monitoring, connections with neighbouring countries, storage and demand-side flexibility.

Antalya's opportunity and responsibility

COP31's official framework is built around putting climate solutions into practice and turning commitments into measurable results.

For COP31 to sustain its claim to be an “implementation COP”, country-level electricity investment programmes must accompany 35×35. If countries announce how many gigawatts of solar and wind they will install without saying how much of that capacity is awaiting a connection, we are seeing only half the picture.

Türkiye could propose a Grid Implementation Scorecard within COP31's voluntary action agenda. Alongside their renewable energy targets, countries could disclose the following indicators: capacity in the connection queue, average connection and permitting times, curtailed renewable generation, annual grid investment, storage and demand flexibility capacity, available capacity on existing lines, and the distribution of new connections among sectors.

Such a scorecard would not create a new climate target. It would show whether existing targets are physically achievable.

To meet national climate and energy targets, the world must add or replace more than 80 million kilometres of electricity lines by 2040. That is equal to the length of the entire grid that exists worldwide today. Annual grid investment also needs to rise from roughly $400 billion to more than $600 billion by 2030. These are not merely engineering figures. They are the material infrastructure of climate targets and the energy transition.

Grid shortages must not become an excuse for slowing renewable energy. The approach of “Let's finish the infrastructure first, then expand clean energy” could produce a new politics of postponement. The right conclusion is to plan grid and renewable investments simultaneously.

At COP31, countries will most likely once again announce how many gigawatts of clean energy they intend to install. But the real pace of the energy transition will be determined not by the number of panels and turbines, but by whether the electricity generated can enter the system.

This is where host country Türkiye's opportunity and responsibility lie. In the arrangement in which Australia leads the negotiations, Türkiye can strengthen the political agenda with concrete implementation programmes. Setting out its own electricity system investment plan, timetable and cost-sharing arrangements would also strengthen the credibility of 35×35.

The grid gap is the transition's physical dimension; finance and cost-sharing are its economic and social dimensions. If Antalya can bring them together in the same programme, 35×35 can become a measurable, concrete infrastructure initiative.

Sources and related research